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Highlights1
• The assumption that people cannot react to the way distribution 
grid tariffs are designed does not hold anymore. This is mainly 
true due to breakthroughs in two game-changing technologies: 
photovoltaics (PV) and batteries. 
• By investing in PV and batteries, active consumers push the 
sunk costs towards passive consumers (equity issue). Ironically, 
the active consumers can even end up paying more (efficiency 
issue). To avoid being screwed by the others, active consumers 
could overinvest. They are in a non-cooperative equilibrium.
• We find that the outcome of this game between the DSO (and 
the regulator) trying to recover sunk costs, and active consumers 
reacting to the distribution grid tariff, depends heavily on the 
way the tariff is designed. 
• It is clear that current distribution grid tariffs are not future-proof. 
The historical conventional practice in the EU is net-metering, 
which creates significant equity issues and is an implicit subsidy 
for the adoption of PV. The solution that is advocated in the 
current debate, capacity charges, creates significant efficiency 
issues and is an implicit subsidy for the adoption of batteries. 
• ‘Bi-directional’ volumetric charges can outperform capacity-
based charges to recover sunk costs, so they should at least be 
considered as an option.
1.  is policy brief is based on: RSCAS Research Paper No. 2017/22 by Schittekatte, T. and Momb-
er, I. and Meeus, L. Available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/46044. Details about the 
assumptions, data, and formulation of the mathematical model can be found in the research 
paper.
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1. Introduction
As Borenstein puts it: “Something is dying alright, 
just not the utility. It’s the ability of regulators, utilities, 
and interest groups to push around revenue collec-
tion among customers without the customers pushing 
back.”1 
 e assumption that people cannot react to the way 
the network charges are accounted for does not hold 
anymore.  e rise of distributed energy resources 
(DER) o ers increased opportunities to exploit the 
existing system of network charges in ways that were 
not originally envisaged.2  is is mainly true due 
to breakthroughs in two game-changing technolo-
gies: photovoltaics (PV) and batteries. PV enable 
consumers to signi cantly reduce their net volume 
of electricity needed from the grid. Batteries enable 
1.  Borenstein, S. (2015). The Decline of Sloppy Electricity Rate Making. 
Energy Insti tute at Haas Blog Post. htt ps://energyathaas.wordpress.
com/2015/08/24/the-decline-of-sloppy-electricity-rate-making/
2.  These are the words of M. Pollitt  in his paper “Electricity network 
charging for ﬂ exibility.” (htt ps://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.7821)
consumers to play with their capacity needs and reg-
ulate their electricity  ows from and to the grid. 
Nowadays, the grid cost recovery problem is a game 
between the DSO and low-voltage consumers.  e 
DSO has the objective to recover its costs, which are 
assumed sunk, and consumers react to the method 
of recovering these sunk costs by installing PV and/
or batteries. 
In this policy brief, we look at the four states of the 
world, illustrated in the  gure below, with high or 
low PV and battery costs. In each state of the world, 
we have 50% active consumers connected to the 
grid, and we look at how they respond to three main 
distribution grid tari  designs that are currently 
debated, i.e. volumetric net-metering, volumetric no 
net-metering3, and capacity charges.
3. Under ‘bi-directi onal’ volumetric network charges the sum of the elec-
tricity withdrawn and injected into the grid is used to calculate the net-
work charges per consumer.
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 e closer the result of a tari  design is near to the 
origin of the matrix in this  gure, the better its per-
formance; we look at e  ciency (i.e. total system 
cost) and equity (i.e. network charges paid by passive 
versus active consumers). Performance is illustrated 
relative to a reference case in which  xed network 
charges are applied. Fixed charges perform opti-
mally in our illustration because we do not consider 
the possibility of going o -grid entirely.
In what follows, we look at each state of the world 
and conclude that main distribution grid tari 
designs are not future-proof.
2.  e past? (High PV, and High Battery 
cost)
Two observations are made in this state of the world. 
Firstly, the results show that applying volumetric net-
work charges with net-metering, the network tari  
design historically in place, does not create e  ciency 
or equity issues for the recovery of the sunk costs. 
 e same result is found for volumetric network 
charges without net-metering.  is can be explained 
by the fact that consumers do not have means to 
change their volume of electricity needed from the 
grid. PV is simply too expensive to invest in. 
A second observation is that with capacity-based 
network charges some ine  ciencies and very lim-
ited equity issues arise.  is result could also be 
interpreted as consumers having limited means to 
regulate the capacity needed from the grid.  ey will 
make some investment in batteries, but very limited 
because the cost is too high.
Overall, consumers have very limited means to 
“push back” in this state of the world.
3.  e unlikely? (High PV, Low Battery 
cost)
A state of the world with high PV investment costs 
and low battery costs is unlikely because the cost of 
PV is already coming down faster than the cost of 
batteries. 
However, this technology cost scenario could be the 
thought of as the future for places where electricity 
generated by PV is too expensive due to low levels of 
solar irradiation combined with few or no govern-
ment subsidies. 
Two observations from this state of the world are 
described below.
Firstly, results for volumetric charges with and 
without net-metering do not change. Net-metering 
does not incentivize investments in batteries for 
active consumers.   erefore, the investment cost 
of batteries does not have any e ect on the results 
for this tari  structure. Under volumetric network 
charges without net-metering, there is an incentive 
to install batteries, although not strong enough in 
this state of the world. 
Secondly, increased ine  ciencies and a more severe 
equity issue for passive consumers resulted with 
capacity-based charges as compared to the previ-
ously described state of the world. In this state of 
the world, active consumers install a high capacity 
of batteries. However, the increase in system costs, 
which is the proxy for e  ciency, is dampened due 
to the low battery costs. An equity issue for passive 
consumers results as the active consumers can sig-
ni cantly shave their peak demand, and thus their 
contribution to the sunk costs, with the high battery 
capacity installed per active consumer.
4 ■  FSR - Policy Brief ■ Issue 2017/03 ■ April 2017
4.  e present? (Low PV, High battery 
cost)
 ree observations can be made for this state of the 
world. 
Firstly, volumetric network charges with net-
metering create severe equity issues and ine  cien-
cies. Since active consumers install the maximum 
amount of PV of which the excess generation is fed 
into the grid, the netted-out grid electricity consump-
tion of the active consumers is signi cantly lowered. 
Consequently, the network charge coe  cient in €/
kWh must increase to allow for cost recovery.  is 
means that the network charges paid by the passive 
consumers increase strongly. Additionally, invest-
ment distortions are created with this network tari  
structure. Under the parameter settings, a kWh of 
electricity from the grid (excluding network and 
other charges) is still slightly cheaper than a kWh of 
electricity produced by a PV panel. With a  xed net-
work tari  in place (in €/consumer to be paid), no 
investment in PV is expected from the rational cost 
minimising active consumer. However, with volu-
metric network charges with net-metering in place 
(in €/kWh), investing in PV becomes a lot more 
attractive as not only energy costs can be avoided but 
also network charges. In other words, net-metering 
acts as an implicit subsidy for the adoption of PV.
Secondly, the result for volumetric network charges 
without net-metering does not change as compared 
to all the previously discussed scenarios. PV is inex-
pensive, and if active consumers installed PV, they 
would avoid paying network charges for withdrawing 
electricity from the grid. However, electricity 
demand does not always coincide with PV produc-
tion and vice-versa. Under this tari  structure, a PV 
owner would also have to pay network charges to 
inject excess energy into the network.  ese charges 
render the business case for an active consumer to 
install a large capacity of PV unattractive. Batteries 
can increase the amount of electricity produced 
on-site that could be used for self-consumption. As 
such, the exchange of electricity with the grid, and 
thus the network charges paid, will be limited. How-
ever, in this state of the world, the installation costs 
of the batteries does not outweigh the potential gains 
made by self-consumptions.
 irdly, the performance of capacity-based charges 
is slightly impacted by a change in the PV invest-
ment cost while keeping the battery investment cost 
constant.  is e ect is even stronger when com-
paring the two states of the world with low battery 
costs and di erent PV investment costs. Lower PV 
costs incentivise investment in PV under this tari  
structure and consequently investment in batteries 
too becomes more attractive.
5.  e future? (Low PV, Low Battery Cost)
 ree highlights are described for this state of the 
world. 
Firstly, the results for volumetric charges with net-
metering in this state of the world do not change 
when compared to the previously described state. 
 is is expected as the only parameter changing 
between those two states is the battery investment 
cost. As described before, with net-metering and no 
time-varying electricity prices or network charges in 
place, there is no incentive for consumers to install 
batteries.
Secondly, the results for volumetric charges without 
net-metering change slightly. In this state of the 
world, the active consumers invest in PV and bat-
teries. However, the installed capacities of both 
PV and batteries remain small, and the amount of 
avoided network charges is limited. Volumetric net-
work charges without net-metering are found to be 
rather robust against investment distortions and 
equity issues, even with low DER costs and 50 % of 
active consumers connected to the grid.
 irdly, the results for capacity-based charges worsen 
signi cantly, both regarding e  ciency and equity, 
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when comparing to the other state of the worlds. 
Ironically, the active consumers even end up paying 
more. To avoid being screwed by the others, active 
consumers indeed overinvest in PV and batteries in 
this scenario up to the point that they are all worse 
o  than if they would not invest at all.  ey are in a 
low-level non-cooperative equilibrium. 
Note that the last observation only happens in this 
future state of the world, and if the share of active 
consumers is assumed to be high (50% or more), but 
it is an important insight for policy makers.
6. Main distribution grid tari  designs 
are not future-proof
We  nd that the outcome of this game between the 
DSO (and the regulator) trying to recover sunk 
costs, and active consumers reacting to the distribu-
tion grid tari , depends heavily on the way the tari  
is designed. Tari  design makes or breaks the busi-
ness case for distributed energy resources at the low-
voltage level, and in its turn, the adoption of these 
technologies can complicate the grid cost recovery 
problem.
It is clear that current distribution grid tari s are 
not future-proof.  e historical conventional prac-
tice in the EU is net-metering, which creates signi -
cant equity issues and is an implicit subsidy for the 
adoption of PV.  e solution that is advocated in the 
current debate, capacity charging, creates signi -
cant e  ciency issues and is an implicit subsidy for 
the adoption of batteries. ‘Bi-directional’ volumetric 
charges can outperform capacity-based charges to 
recover sunk costs, so they should at least be consid-
ered as an option.
 e story is even more complicated because imple-
mentation matters and the context matters. First, 
implementation matters because capacity charges 
can be implemented in many di erent ways. Second, 
context matters because the level and the way policy 
costs are recovered via the energy bills di ers sig-
ni cantly across Europe; and for some countries, the 
main issue might not be to recover sunk costs, but 
rather to give the right incentives for future distribu-
tion grid expansion.  ese issues will be discussed in 
our future work.
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